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We develop a model where institutions form connections through swaps of projects
in order to diversify their individual risk. These connections lead to two diﬀerent net-
work structures. In a clustered network groups of ﬁnancial institutions hold identical
portfolios and default together. In an unclustered network defaults are more dispersed.
With long term ﬁnance welfare is the same in both networks. In contrast, when short
term ﬁnance is used, the network structure matters. Upon the arrival of a signal
about banks’ future defaults, investors update their expectations of bank solvency. If
their expectations are low, they do not roll over the debt and there is systemic risk
in that all institutions are early liquidated. We compare investors’ rollover decisions
and welfare in the two networks.
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11 Introduction
Understanding the nature of systemic risk is key to understanding the occurrence and
propagation of ﬁnancial crises. The term usually refers to a situation where many (if
not all) ﬁnancial institutions fail as a result of a common shock or a contagion process.
Herring and Wachter (2001) and Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) ﬁnd evidence that a collapse
of residential or commercial real estate values is the main cause for system wide failures
of ﬁnancial institutions during many ﬁnancial crises. Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas,
Parigi and Rochet (2000) and numerous other subsequent papers (see Allen, Babus and
Carletti, 2009, for a survey) analyze the risk of contagion where the failure of one ﬁnancial
institution leads to the default of other ﬁnancial institutions through a domino eﬀect. This
type of systemic risk is often used by central banks as the justiﬁcation for intervening and
bailing out institutions that are “too big to fail”.
The recent developments in ﬁnancial markets and the crisis that started in 2007 have
highlighted the importance of another type of systemic risk related to the structure of
connections among ﬁnancial institutions and their funding maturity. The emergence of
ﬁnancial instruments in the form of credit default swaps and other credit derivative prod-
ucts, loan sales and collateralized loan obligations has improved the possibility for ﬁnancial
institutions to diversify risk. However, it has also led to more overlap and more similar-
ities among their portfolios. This has increased the probability that the failure of one
institution is likely to coincide with the failure of other similar institutions. Combining
this with a greater reliance on wholesale short term ﬁnance has increased rollover risk for
ﬁnancial institutions. When a bank is in diﬃculty, investors may fear that other banks
with similar portfolios will also be in trouble and hence may refuse to reinvest their funds.
Financial markets can dry up and push all banks into diﬃculties.
In this paper we focus on the interaction between ﬁnancial connections and funding
maturity in generating systemic risk. We develop a simple two-period model, where each
bank invests in a risky project and needs external funds to ﬁnance it. Investors provide
the funds to the banks in exchange for a debt contract. We initially consider the case of
2long term debt and subsequently that of short term debt. As projects are risky, banks
may default at the ﬁnal date. When this occurs, investors recover the return of the bank’s
project net of bankruptcy costs, while the bank does not receive anything. When default
does not occur, investors obtain the repayment speciﬁed in the debt contract and the
bank retains any surplus. As project returns are independently distributed, each bank has
an incentive to diversify by exchanging shares of its own project with other banks. This
lowers banks’ individual default probabilities and bankruptcy costs thus allowing them to
promise investors a lower repayment. However, exchanging projects is costly. Banks incur
a due diligence cost for each project they exchange. In equilibrium, banks trade oﬀ the
advantages of diversiﬁcation with the due diligence costs.
The exchange of project shares forms links among banks that lead to overlaps in their
portfolios. Banks choose the number of links but not the network structure that emerges
in equilibrium. For ease of exposition, we focus on the case of six banks with each of them
optimally forming two connections with other banks. This leads to two possible network
structures. In one, which we call clustered, banks are connected in two clusters of three
banks each. Within each cluster all banks hold the same portfolio, but the two clusters
are independent of each other. In the second network, which we call unclustered, banks
are connected in a circle. Each of them exchanges projects only with the two neighboring
banks so that none of the banks holds identical portfolios.
We show that with long term debt the structure of the network does not matter
for welfare. The reason is that in either network each bank’s portfolio is formed by
three independently distributed projects with the same distribution of returns. Thus,
the number of bank defaults and the expected costs of default are the same in the two
structures and so is total welfare.
In contrast, the structure of the network plays an important role in determining sys-
temic risk and welfare when banks use short term debt. The main diﬀerence is that at the
intermediate date investors decide whether to roll over their investments conditional on a
signal concerning banks’ future solvency. The signal indicates whether all banks will be
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will not be able to repay investors the promised repayment (bad news). Upon observing
the signal, investors update the probability that their bank will be solvent at the ﬁnal
period and roll over the debt if they expect to be able to recover their opportunity cost.
They always roll over the debt when there is a good signal but not when there is a bad
one. When rollover does not occur, all banks are forced into early liquidation. This source
of systemic risk is the focus of our analysis. Investors’ rollover decisions depend on the
structure of the network, investors’ opportunity cost and the magnitude of bankruptcy
costs.
We show that, upon the arrival of bad news, rollover occurs less often in the clustered
than in the unclustered network. When investors recover enough in the case of default
or have a low opportunity cost, debt is rolled over in both networks. As the amount
they recover decreases and their opportunity cost increases, debt is still rolled over in the
unclustered network but not in the clustered one. The reason is that defaults are more
concentrated in the clustered network than in the unclustered network. Investors infer
that the probability of default conditional on the bad signal is high and thus decide not to
roll over. In the unclustered network defaults are less concentrated and the arrival of the
bad signal indicates a lower probability of a rash of bank defaults. When investors obtain
little after banks default because of high bankruptcy costs or have a high opportunity cost,
banks are early liquidated in both networks.
The welfare properties of the two network structures with short term ﬁnance depend
on the investors’ rollover decisions, the proceeds from early liquidation and the bankruptcy
costs. When banks continue and oﬀer investors a repayment of the same magnitude in
either network, total welfare is the same in the two network structures. When the debt
rollover requires a higher promised repayment in the clustered than in the unclustered
network, welfare is higher in the latter as it entails lower bankruptcy costs. When the
debt is not rolled over in the clustered network only, the comparison of total welfare
becomes ambiguous. Initially, when neither the bankruptcy costs nor the proceeds from
4early liquidation are too high, total welfare remains higher in the unclustered network.
However, as investors recover little in the case of bankruptcy and a large amount in the
case of early liquidation, welfare becomes higher in the clustered network, and remains so
even when early liquidation occurs in both network structures.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. Concerning the eﬀects of diversiﬁ-
cation on banks’ portfolio risk, Shaﬀer (1994) argues that while diversiﬁcation is good for
each bank individually, it can lead to greater systemic risk as banks’ investments become
more similar. Wagner (2010) shows in a model with two banks that diversiﬁcation can
increase the likelihood of systemic crises and thus be undesirable. Ibragimov, Jaﬀee and
Walden (2010) identify conditions under which it may be socially optimal to have ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries hold less diversiﬁed portfolios in order to have a lower probability of
widespread collapses. In these papers, banks always have the same portfolios and social
welfare is non-linearly decreasing in the number of bank failures in the system. We consider
a framework where the degree of diversiﬁcation, the network structure and the funding
structure of ﬁnancial institutions interact in determining systemic risk and welfare.
In terms of the rollover risk entailed by short term ﬁnance, Acharya, Gale and Yorul-
mazer (2009) explain market freezes in the presence of rollover risk based on incoming
information and transaction costs. He and Xiong (2009) show that rollover risk leads to
dynamic bank runs. Concerning liquidity risk more generally, Diamond and Rajan (2009)
ﬁnd that liquidity dry-ups can arise from the fear of ﬁre sales; while Bolton, Santos and
Scheinkman (2009) look at maturity mismatch and its impact on liquidity demand when
there is asymmetric information. All these studies use a representative bank/agent frame-
work. By contrast, we analyze how diﬀerent network structures aﬀect the rollover risk
resulting from short term ﬁnance.
More generally, our paper is also related to a strand of literature stressing the im-
portance of externalities among banks as a source of systemic risk (see Allen and Babus,
2009, for a survey on contagion in ﬁnancial networks). For example, Boyson, Stahel and
Stulz (2008) provide evidence of such externalities within the hedge fund sector, while
5Billio et al. (2010) measure the interconnectedness among hedge funds, banks, brokers,
and insurance companies and their impact on systemic risk. Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2009) and Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2009) point out that designing regulation on
banks’ individually optimal risk management may not be appropriate. Our paper relates
to this literature in that it analyzes how the individual choice of the optimal degree of
diversiﬁcation may lead to multiple network structures with very diﬀerent properties in
terms of systemic risk and welfare.
Some other papers study the extent to which banks internalize the negative externali-
ties that arise from contagion. For instance, Babus (2009) proposes a model where banks
share the risk that the failure of one bank propagates through contagion to the entire sys-
tem. Castiglionesi and Navarro (2010) show that an agency problem between shareholders
and debt holders of a bank leads to fragile ﬁnancial networks. Zawadowski (2010) takes a
diﬀerent approach to show that banks that are connected in a network of hedging contracts
fail to internalize the negative eﬀect of their own failure. Banks funded with short-term
debt hold insuﬃcient capital to prevent lenders from running. All these papers rely on a
domino eﬀe c ta sas o u r c eo fs y s t e m i cr i s k . B yc o n t r a s t ,w ef o c u so nd i v e r s i ﬁcation and
overlaps in banks’ portfolios as a source of systemic risk in the presence of information
externalities.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model when banks
use long term debt. Section 3 describes the equilibrium that emerges in this case in terms of
the individually optimal degree of diversiﬁcation and the multiple network structures that
can arise from it. Section 4 introduces short term debt. It analyzes investors’ decision to
roll over the debt in response to information about banks’ future solvency and the welfare
properties of the diﬀerent network structures. Section 5 discusses a number of extensions
of the basic model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
62 The basic model with long term ﬁnance
Consider a three-date ( =0 12) economy with six banks, denoted by  =1 6,a n d
a continuum of small, risk-neutral investors. Each bank  has access at date 0 to an
investment project that yields a stochastic return  = { } at date 2 with probability
 and 1−, respectively, and     0. The returns of the projects are independently
distributed across banks.
Banks raise one unit of funds each from investors at date 0 and oﬀer them, in exchange,
a long term debt contract that speciﬁes an interest rate  to be paid at date 2. Investors
provide ﬁnance to one bank only and are willing to do so if they expect to recover at least
their two period opportunity cost 2
  ().
We assume that   2
   so that a bank can pay  only when the project yields
a high return. When the project yields a low return , the bank defaults at date 2 and
investors recover a fraction  ∈ [01] of the project return. The remaining fraction (1−)
is lost as bankruptcy costs. Thus, investors will ﬁnance the bank only if their participation
constraint as given by
 +( 1− ) ≥ 2

is satisﬁed. The ﬁrst term on the left hand side represents the expected payoﬀ to the in-
vestors when the bank repays them in full. The second term represents investors’ expected
payoﬀ when the bank defaults at date 2. The right hand side is the investors’ opportunity
cost.
When the project returns , the bank acquires the surplus ( − ). Otherwise, it
receives 0. The bank’s expected proﬁti st h e ng i v e nb y
 = ( − )
Given projects are risky and returns are independently distributed, banks can reduce
their default risk through diversiﬁcation. This reduces expected bankruptcy costs (1 −
)(1−) and investors’ promised repayment . Each bank exchanges shares of its own
7project with  other banks and connections are bilateral. That is, bank  exchanges a
share of its project with bank  if and only if bank  exchanges a share of its project with
bank . When this happens, there is a link between banks  and  denoted as .T h e n
each bank  ends up with a portfolio of 1+ projects with a return equal to
 =
1 + 2 +  + 1+
1+

Exchanging shares of projects with other banks entails a due diligence cost  per link.
The idea is that banks know their own project, but they do not know those of the other
banks. Thus they need to exert costly eﬀort to check that the projects of the banks they
want to form links with are bona ﬁde as well.
The exchange of project shares creates linkages among banks. The collection of all
linkages can be described as a network . In any network, each bank has shares of 1+
independently distributed projects in its portfolio. The banks’ portfolios now overlap in
the sense that they hold not only their own project but those of other banks too. The
degree of overlap depends on the number of links  that each bank has with other banks
and on the structure of links among banks. For a given  there may be multiple network
structures as discussed below.
3L o n g t e r m ﬁnance
We model banks’ portfolio decisions as a network formation game. We ﬁrst derive the
participation constraint of the investors and banks’ proﬁts when each bank  has  links
with other banks and holds a portfolio of 1+ projects. An equilibrium network structure
is one where banks maximize their expected proﬁts and do not ﬁnd it worthwhile to sever
or add a link.
We denote as  ≡ () t h ei n t e r e s tr a t et h a tb a n k promises investors in a network
 where banks have  links and 1+ projects. Investors receive  at date 2 when the
return of bank ’s portfolio,  is  ≥ , while they receive a fraction  of the bank’s
8portfolio return when   . The participation constraint of the investors is then given
by
Pr( ≥ ) + (  ) ≥ 2
 (1)
where Pr( ≥ ) is the probability that the bank remains solvent at date 2 and ( 
)=
P
 Pr( = ) is the bank’s expected portfolio return when it defaults at
date 2. The equilibrium  is the lowest interest rate that satisﬁes (1) with equality.
Diversiﬁcation increases the probability Pr( ≥ ) that investors receive their promised
return  thus reducing bankruptcy costs and allowing the banks to oﬀer a lower rate of
return to investors.
Banks receive the surplus  −  whenever  ≥  and 0 otherwise. The expected
proﬁt of a bank  in a network  is
()=( ≥ ) − Pr( ≥ ) −  (2)
where ( ≥ )=
P
≥ Pr( = ) is the expected return of the bank’s portfolio,
Pr( ≥ ) is the expected repayment to investors when the bank remains solvent at
date 2,a n d are the total due diligence costs. Substituting the equilibrium interest rate
 from (1) with equality into (2), the expected proﬁto fb a n k becomes
()=() − 2
 − (1 − )(  ) −  (3)
The bank’s expected proﬁt is given by the expected return of its portfolio () minus
the investors’ opportunity cost 2
, the expected bankruptcy costs (1 − )(  ),a n d
the total due diligence costs . As (3) shows, greater diversiﬁcation involves a trade-oﬀ
between lower bankruptcy costs and higher total due diligence costs.
Banks choose the number of links  in order to maximize their expected proﬁts. The
choice of  determines the (possibly multiple) equilibrium network structure(s). A network
 is an equilibrium if it satisﬁes the notion of pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and
9Wolinsky (1996). This is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 An e t w o r k is pairwise stable if
(i) for any pair of banks  and  that are linked in the network , neither of them has
an incentive to unilaterally sever their link . That is, the expected proﬁt each of them
receives from deviating to the network ( − ) is not larger than the expected proﬁt that
each of them obtains in the network  (( − ) ≤ () and ( − ) ≤ ());
(ii) for any two banks  and  that are not linked in the network , at least one of them
has no incentive to form the link . That is, the expected proﬁt that at least one of them
receives from deviating to the network ( + ) is not larger than the expected proﬁt that
it obtains in the network  (( + ) ≤ () and/or ( + ) ≤ ()).
To make the analysis more tractable, we impose a condition to ensure that for any
 =0 5 the bank is bankrupt and is unable to repay  to investors at date 2 only when
all projects in its portfolio pay oﬀ . When this is the case, the probability of the bank
defaulting at date 2 is Pr(  )=( 1− )1+ and the probability of the bank being
solvent at date 2 is Pr( ≥ )=1− (1 − )1+. As shown in the Appendix, a suﬃcient
condition to ensure this is
(1 − (1 − )6)
5 + 
6
+( 1− )6 ≥ 2
 (4)
Condition (4) guarantees that there exists an interest rate  in the interval [2
 +
1+ ]
that satisﬁes the investors’ participation constraint (1) for any  =0 5,w h e r e+
1+
is the next smallest return realization of a bank’s portfolio after all projects return .
Given (4), the bank’s expected proﬁt (3) can be written as
()=() − 2
 − (1 − )1+(1 − ) − .( 5 )
It is easy to show that (5) is concave in  as the second derivative with respect to  is
negative.
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optimal to have  =2links and only symmetric networks are formed. The reason is that
this is the minimum number of links such that there are multiple network structures. We
have the following.
Proposition 1 For any  ∈ [(1−)3(1−)(1−)2(1−)] an e t w o r k∗ where
all banks have ∗ =2links is pairwise stable and Pareto dominates equilibria with ∗ 6=2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
In equilibrium banks trade oﬀ the beneﬁto fg r e a t e rd i v e r s i ﬁcation in terms of lower
expected bankruptcy costs with higher total due diligence costs. Proposition 1 identiﬁes
the parameter space for the cost  such that this trade oﬀ is optimal at ∗ =2 .
Banks choose the number of links but not the network structure so that multiple
networks can emerge, for a given number of links. With ∗ =2there are two equilibrium
networks ∗ a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1 .I nt h eﬁr s tn e t w o r k ,t h a tw ed e ﬁne as clustered ( = ),
banks are connected in two clusters of three banks each. Within each cluster, banks hold
identical portfolios but the two clusters are independent of each other. In the second
network, denoted as unclustered ( = ), banks are all connected in a circle. Each of
them exchanges projects only with the two neighboring banks so that none of the banks
holds identical portfolios. In this sense, risk is more concentrated in the clustered than in
the unclustered network.
Both networks are pairwise stable if the due diligence cost  is in the interval [(1 −
)3(1 − )(1 − )2(1 − )]. No bank has an incentive to deviate by severing or
adding a link as it obtains higher expected proﬁt in equilibrium. Given that the bank’s
expected proﬁt function is concave in  and that investors always recover their opportunity
cost, the restriction on  in Proposition 1 also guarantees that the equilibrium with ∗ =2
is the best achievable.
We next consider welfare in the two networks. For either of them, the welfare per bank
is the sum of a representative bank ’s expected proﬁt and its investors’ expected returns.
11Given that the investors always recover their opportunity cost, from (5) the welfare per
bank is simply given by
()=() − (1 − )(  ) −  (6)
Expression (6) indicates that in the case of long term ﬁnancing total welfare per bank is
just equal to the sum of each bank’s expected portfolio return () net of the expected
bankruptcy costs (1−)(  ) and the total due diligence costs . In either equilib-
rium network each bank’s portfolio is formed by 1+∗ independently distributed projects
with the same distribution of returns. This implies that in both networks all banks oﬀer
the same interest rate to investors and have the same bankruptcy probability. This gives
the following result.
Proposition 2 Total welfare is the same in the clustered and unclustered networks.
4 Short term ﬁnance
In the previous sections we have assumed that the maturity of the ﬁnancing matches the
maturity of the assets. Now we analyze the case where banks use short term ﬁnance and
investors have per period opportunity cost . As with long term ﬁnance, we continue
focusing on the clustered and unclustered networks with ∗ =2and on the range  
2
  5+
6 . We show that the structure of the network matters for systemic risk and
total welfare when short term ﬁnance is used.
The main diﬀerence with short term ﬁnance is that it needs to be rolled over every
period. If adverse information arrives, investors may refuse to roll over the debt thus
forcing the bank into early liquidation. To capture this, we assume that a signal on the
banks’ future portfolio returns arrives at date 1. The signal can either indicate the good
news that all banks will be solvent at date 2 ( = ) or the bad news that at least one
bank will default ( = ). The idea is that investors hear of a bank failure and then have
to infer the prospects of their own bank. For simplicity, we assume that the signal does
12not reveal any information about any individual bank. As far as individual investors are
concerned, all banks look alike and have an equal probability of default once the signal
arrives.
Figure 2 shows the sequence of events in the model with short term ﬁnance. At date 0
each bank in network  =  raises one unit of funds and promises investors an interest
rate 01() at date 1. Investors know the network structure, but do not know the position
of any particular bank in the network. At the beginning of date 1, before investors are
repaid 01(), the signal  = {} arrives. With probability () the signal  = 
reveals the good news that all banks will be solvent at date 2. With probability 1 − ()
the signal  =  reveals the bad news that at least one bank will default at date 2.U p o n
observing the signal, investors decide whether to retain 01() or roll it over for a total
promised repayment of 
12() at date 2. If rollover occurs, the bank continues till date 2.
Investors receive 
12() and the bank  − 
12() if it remains solvent. Otherwise, when
the bank goes bankrupt, investors receive  and the bank 0. If rollover does not occur,
the bank is forced into early liquidation at date 1. Investors receive the proceeds from
early liquidation, which for simplicity we assume to be equal to , and the bank receives
0. We discuss the case where early liquidation pays oﬀ less than  in Section 5 below.
The interest rate 01() promised to investors at date 0 must be such that they recover
their per period opportunity cost  at date 1. Given that the proceeds from early liquida-
tion are equal to , investors always recover their opportunity cost at date 1, irrespective
of whether the bank is continued or liquidated at date 1. This implies that they will always
ﬁnance the bank initially and that 01()=.
At date 1, after the signal  is realized, the bank oﬀers investors a promised repayment

12(). Investors roll over the debt if 
12() is such that they can recover 01() = 2
 at
date 2.W h e n =  all banks will be solvent at date 2. Investors infer that the probability
Pr( ≥ 
12()|) of receiving 
12() at date 2 is equal to 1 as shown in Figure 2. Thus,
they roll over the debt and 
12()=2
.
When  = , at least one bank will default at date 2. Investors’ probability of receiving
13the promised repayment 
12() at date 2 becomes Pr( ≥ 
12()|). Rollover occurs if
t h e r ee x i s t sav a l u eo f






The ﬁrst term is the expected payoﬀ to investors when  ≥ 
12() and the bank remains
s o l v e n ta td a t e2 conditional on  = . The second term is the expected payoﬀ to
investors conditional on  =  when   
12() and the bank defaults at date 2 In this





12() Pr( = |). The equilibrium value of 
12() if it exists, is the minimum
promised repayment that satisﬁes (7) with equality and minimizes the probability of bank
default conditional on  = . As we discuss below, the terms Pr( ≥ 
12()|) and
(  
12()|) in (7) depend on the network . As a result, investors’ rollover decision
may diﬀer in the two networks.
The expected proﬁto fb a n k at date 0 depends on the realization of the signal and
on the investors’ rollover decision at date 1. When rollover occurs and the bank continues
















The ﬁrst term represents the expected proﬁt when with probability () the good signal
 =  occurs. Investors receive 2
 at date 2 and the bank retains the expected surplus
( ≥ 2
|) − 2




 Pr( = |) is the bank’s expected
portfolio return conditional on  =  when  ≥ 2
. The second term is the expected
proﬁt when with probability 1 − () the bad signal  =  occurs. With probability
Pr( ≥ 
12()|) the bank remains solvent. It pays 
12() to investors and retains
the remaining ( ≥ 
12()|) − Pr( ≥ 
12()|)




12() Pr( = |) is the bank’s expected portfolio return conditional on  = 
when  ≥ 
12(). The last term 2 is the total due diligence costs with ∗ =2 .
14Substituting the promised repayment 
12() from (7) with equality into (8), this sim-
pliﬁes to
()=() − 2
 − (1 − ())(1 − )(  
12()|) − 2 (9)
When rollover occurs at date 1, the bank’s expected proﬁtc a nb ee x p r e s s e da si nt h e
case of long term debt by the expected return of its portfolio () minus the investors’
opportunity cost 2
, the expected bankruptcy costs (1 − ())(1 − )(  
12()|),
and the total due diligence costs 2.
When, after the realization of the bad signal, rollover does not occur and the bank is








The bank now has positive expected proﬁt only when with probability () the good
signal is received. When with probability 1−() the bad signal occurs, the bank is early
liquidated and receives 0. Note that (9) and (10) imply that, in a given network ,t h e
bank’s expected proﬁti sh i g h e rw h e nd e b ti sr o l l e do v e ra td a t e1 than when it is not.
4.1 Investors’ rollover decisions at date 1
The crucial diﬀerence between long and short term ﬁnancing is that in the latter case the
network structure matters for the equilibrium interest rates, bank proﬁts and ultimately
total welfare whereas it does not in the former case. The reason is that the probability
distribution of the signal and the associated conditional probabilities of bank default at
date 2 diﬀer in the two networks.
To see this, we start by considering the distribution of the signal .W ef o c u so nt h e
case where ∗ =2and bankruptcy only occurs when all projects in a bank’s portfolio return
. Thus, the good signal arrives when all banks’ portfolios return at least (2+)3
and investors are able to obtain the opportunity cost 2
 at date 2. In contrast, the bad
signal arrives when at least one of the banks has all three projects in its portfolio return








)=P r ( 1 ≥ 2
 2 ≥ 2
 6 ≥ 2
) represents the probability
that none of the six banks defaults. The probability of  =  is then 1 − ().
Tables 1 and 2 show all banks’ portfolio return realizations and the number of banks
defaulting for the clustered and unclustered networks, respectively. For simplicity, we
assume that the probability of a project  returning  is  = 1
2 and  is 1 −  = 1
2.
This implies that all states are equally likely. Since there are 6 projects and each of them
can have two possible returns, there are 26 =6 4states numbered in the ﬁrst column of
both tables describing the possible project return realizations at date 2.
Table 1 is for the clustered network. The ﬁrst set of columns shows the return realiza-
tions of the six projects. The second set of columns shows each bank’s portfolio returns
in the two clusters. The last column shows the total number of bank defaults. The good
signal occurs when all banks have a portfolio return of at least (2+)3 and no banks
have a portfolio return  so there are no defaults. These are the unshaded states in the
table. It can be seen that there are 49 of them. This means that the good signal arrives





The remaining 15 states are the default states and are shaded in gray in the table. In
14 of these there are 3 banks defaulting and in 1 of them all 6 banks default. This is
because banks hold identical portfolios within a cluster. There are 48 bank defaults across
all states.
Table 2 is for the unclustered network. The ﬁrst set of columns shows the return
realizations of the six projects, while the second set shows each bank’s portfolio returns.
The last column shows the total number of defaults. It can be seen that there are now
1639 unshaded states where all banks are solvent. This means that the good signal in the





The remaining 25 shaded states are where at least one default occurs. In 12 of these 1
bank defaults, in 6 states 2 banks default, in 6 other states 3 banks default and in 1 state
all 6 banks default. Again, there are 48 total bank defaults across all states, but they
are now more spread out across the states. There are more default states but with less
banks defaulting on average in each. The reason is that in the unclustered network banks
are all connected but none holds identical portfolios. Thus risk is less concentrated in the
unclustered than in the clustered network.
It can be seen that the probability of receiving the good signal  =  is higher in the
clustered network than in the unclustered network, that is
()  () (11)
What matters for investors’ rollover decisions are the conditional probability distri-
butions of banks’ portfolio returns. Tables 3 and 4 show these for the clustered and
unclustered networks, respectively. In the clustered network there are 49 states with the
good signal. Since none of them has any default, the probability of  =  conditional
on the good signal is 0 in Table 3. Counting the number of states among those unshaded
i nT a b l e1w h e r eb a n k has portfolio return  = 2+
3 gives 21. Since this is the same
for all 6 banks, the probability that bank  has  = 2+
3 is 21
49. Similarly for the other
returns  given the good signal. There are 15 states where bankruptcy occurs and the
bad signal is realized. Among those states each bank  has portfolio return  =  in 8
states. Thus, the probability that any bank  has  =  is 8
15. Similarly for the other
entries conditional on the bad signal.
17The diﬀerence in the unclustered network is that there are 39 rather than 49 states
where all banks are solvent and the good signal is realized. Again, since no banks default
in these states, the probability of  =  conditional on  =  in Table 4 is 0.A m o n g
the 39 states, it can be seen from Table 2 that each bank  has  = 2+
3 in 13
states. Thus, the probability for any bank to have  = 2+
3 is 13
39. Similarly for
the other entries conditional on  = . Among the shaded 25 states in Table 2 where
bankruptcy occurs, it can be easily seen that each bank  has a portfolio return  = 
with probability 8
25 as shown in Table 4. Similarly for the other entries conditional on
 =  in Table 4.
Comparing Tables 3 and 4, it can be seen that the conditional distributions of banks’
portfolio returns are quite diﬀerent in the two networks. In particular, the probability
of  =  conditional on  =  in the clustered network, which is equal to 8
15 is
much higher than in the unclustered network, where it is 8
25. This also implies that the
conditional probability Pr( ≥ 
12()|) that the bank is solvent and repays 
12() to
the investors at date 2 conditional on  =  is higher in the unclustered than in the
clustered network. That is,
Pr( ≥ 
12()|)  Pr( ≥ 
12()|) (12)
for 
12() ∈ [ 2+
3 ].T h i s d i ﬀerence means that rollover decisions can also diﬀer
between the two networks. We study the clustered network ﬁrst.
Proposition 3 When the bad signal ( = )i sr e a l i z e di nt h ec l u s t e r e dn e t w o r ka n d
  13
12,
















C+D. For  (), investors do not roll over the debt and the bank is early
18liquidated at date 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 3, which plots investors’ rollover decisions as a
function of the exogenous parameters  and 2
. The result follows immediately from the
investors’ participation constraint at date 1. When the bad signal is realized, the bank
continues at date 1 whenever investors can be promised a repayment that satisﬁes (7).
Whether this is possible depends on the fraction  of the bank’s portfolio return that the
investors receive at date 2 when the bank defaults and on the opportunity cost 2
 they
require over the two periods. When  is high or 2
 is low as in Region A in Figure 3, there
exists a repayment 
12() that satisﬁes (7). Investors roll over the debt and the bank
continues. The promised repayment compensates the investors for the possibility that
they obtain only  in case of default. Given  is high, 
12() does not need to be high
for (7) to be satisﬁed. Thus, the equilibrium 
12() lies in the lowest interval of the bank’s
portfolio return, [2
 2+
3 ].A s decreases or 2
 increases so that Region B is reached,
investors still roll over the debt but require a higher promised repayment to compensate
them for the greater losses in the case of bank default. Thus, 
12() is higher and lies in
the interval [2+
3  +2
3 ]. This also implies that, conditional on the realization of
the bad signal, bankruptcy does not occur at date 2 only when all projects in a bank’s
portfolio pay oﬀ  but also when they pay 2+
3 .A s  decreases or 2
 increases
further so that Regions C and D below () are reached, it is no longer possible to
satisfy (7) for any 
12() ≤ . Then, investors do not roll over the debt and the bank is
early liquidated at date 1.
A similar result holds for the unclustered network.
Proposition 4 When the bad signal ( = )i sr e a l i z e di nt h eu n c l u s t e r e dn e t w o r k ,








D. For  (), investors do not roll over the debt and the bank is liquidated at
date 1.
19Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 is also illustrated in Figure 3. As in the clustered network, debt is rolled
over when investors can be promised a repayment 
12 enough to satisfy their participation
constraint (7) with equality. Whether such a repayment exists depends again on the
parameters  and 2
. When they lie in the Regions A, B and C above (),i t
is possible to satisfy investors’ participation constraint and the debt is rolled over. In
contrast, when  and 2
 lie in Region D this is no longer possible and the debt is not
rolled over. Note that diﬀerently from the clustered network, when rollover occurs the
bank always oﬀe r si n v e s t o r sap r o m i s e dr e p a y m e n t
12() in the interval [2
 2+
3 ].
The reason is that the probability Pr( ≥ 
12()|) is suﬃciently high to ensure that
(7) can be satisﬁed for a low 
12().
A comparison of propositions 3 and 4 shows that rollover occurs for a larger and early
liquidation for a smaller parameter space in the unclustered network than in the clustered.
The promised repayment is also the same or lower in the former.
4.2 Welfare with short term ﬁnance
We next consider welfare in the two networks with short term ﬁnance. As with long term
ﬁnance, in both networks we can focus on the total welfare per bank as deﬁned by the sum
of a representative bank ’s expected proﬁt and its investors’ expected returns. Welfare
now depends on the investors’ rollover decisions, since these aﬀect the bank’s expected
proﬁt. Using (9) and (10), when the bank is continued till date 2 welfare is given by
()=() − (1 − ())(1 − )(  
12()|) − 2 (13)







 − 2 (14)
In (13), welfare is given by the expected return of bank portfolio () minus the
20expected bankruptcy costs (1 − ())(1 − )(  
12()|) and the due diligence






when the good signal is realized and the bank is solvent plus the
date 2 value of the liquidation proceeds (1 − ())2
 minus the due diligence costs 2.
Deriving () and () from (13) and (14) for the two networks gives the following
result.
Proposition 5 The comparison of total welfare in the two networks is as follows:
A. For  ≥ (), total welfare is the same in the clustered and unclustered net-
work: ()=().
B+C1. For   (), total welfare is higher in the unclustered network




C2+D. For  , total welfare is higher in the clustered network than in the un-
clustered network: () ().
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 4 illustrates the proposition by showing the welfare in the clustered and un-
clustered network. It can be seen that with short term ﬁnance total welfare depends on
the network structure. Which structure is better depends crucially on the parameters 
and 2
. As (13) shows, the parameter  aﬀects welfare when debt is rolled over as it
determines the size of the expected bankruptcy costs that are lost when the bank defaults
at date 2. As (14) shows, the parameter 2
 is important for welfare because when the debt
is not rolled over it is equal to the date 2 value of the proceeds from early liquidation.




3 ] in both networks. Each bank defaults when its portfolio
pays oﬀ  and makes positive proﬁts in all the other states in either network. As with
long term ﬁnance, total welfare is then the same in both networks.
In Region B, where  lies in between () and (), investors still roll over




3 ]. This implies that bank  defaults not
only when  =  but also when  = 2+
3 . As a result total welfare is lower in the
clustered network relative to the unclustered network because expected bankruptcy costs
are higher.
In Regions C1 and C2 in Figure 4 the debt is rolled over when the bad signal is realized
in the unclustered network but not in the clustered one so that banks now make positive
proﬁts only when the good signal is realized in the latter network. Total welfare is then
given by (13) and (14) in the unclustered and clustered networks, respectively. In the
former, welfare is decreasing in the bankruptcy costs, 1 − . Thus, it decreases as 
falls. In the latter, welfare is increasing with 2
 as this increases the proceeds from early
liquidation and there are no bankruptcy costs. As  falls and 2
 increases, total welfare
in the unclustered network becomes equal to that in the clustered network, and it then
drops below.
Finally, in Region D, where  ≤ (), banks are early liquidated in both networks
when the bad signal is realized so that total welfare is always given by (14). The clustered
network attains higher welfare in this region as from (11) the good signal occurs more often.





in the clustered network and
to a higher date 2 value of the early liquidation proceeds (1 − ())2
 in the unclustered
network. The ﬁrst term dominates, thus leading to higher total welfare in the clustered
network.
5 Discussion
In this section we consider a number of extensions of the basic model. In particular, we
discuss long term versus short term ﬁnance, diﬀerent types of signal arriving at the interim
date, a more general speciﬁcation of the early liquidation proceeds, and ﬁnally diﬀerent
types of coordination mechanisms in the formation of linkages among banks.
225.1 Long term versus short term ﬁnance
In Section 3 we assumed that the maturity of the ﬁnancing matches the maturity of the
assets, while in Section 4 we considered short term ﬁnance. In practice, banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions have a choice of long and short term ﬁnance. There are a number
of theories as to why diﬀerent maturities are used. For example, Flannery (1986) and
Diamond (1991) suggest that short term ﬁnance of long term assets can help overcome
asymmetric information problems in credit markets. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and
Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue that short term debt in a bank’s capital structure can
play a role as a discipline device to ensure managers behave optimally. Brunnermeier
and Oehmke (2009) suggest that creditors shorten the maturity of their claims to obtain
priority, leading to an excessive use of short term debt. Another important rationale for
the use of short term debt is the upward sloping yield curve. Borrowing short term at low
rates to ﬁnance high yielding long term assets allows signiﬁcant proﬁts to be made.
We have not speciﬁcally modelled the choice of maturity structure. However, a simple
way to do this is to assume that the short term rate  is suﬃciently below the long
term rate  so that the use of short term debt is optimal. This raises the issue of
what determines the yield curve. One approach is that the rates for diﬀerent horizons
are determined by the access of investors to risk free technologies that last for diﬀerent
maturities.
5.2 Diﬀerent types of signal
The core of our analysis is the interaction between the signal arriving at date 1, the network
structure, and the funding maturity. So far the signal has been modelled as indicating
whether at least one bank will default at date 2 without any information about the identity
of potentially failing banks. Investors know the network structure but do not know any
bank’s position in it. Upon observing the signal, they update the conditional probability
that their own bank will default at date 2. The important feature for our result is that
the conditional probability of default in the clustered network is diﬀerent from that in
23the unclustered network. The reason is that the signal generates a diﬀerent information
partition of the states in the two network structures. This leads to diﬀerent rollover and
early liquidation decisions with short term debt in the two networks.
Any signal that generates diﬀerent information partitions and leads to diﬀerent condi-
tional probabilities across network structures will have the same qualitative eﬀect as in our
basic model. For example, a signal indicating that a particular bank, say bank 1, has gone
bankrupt would lead to the same kind of results. Similarly for a signal indicating that a
particular real sector is more likely to fail. This would correspond in our model to a signal
indicating that a particular project or set of projects has a higher default probability than
originally believed. This signal would generate diﬀerent information partitions on banks’
future defaults depending on the diﬀerent compositions of banks’ portfolios and would
thus still lead to diﬀerent conditional probabilities across the two networks.
A signal that does not lead to diﬀerent conditional probabilities is one bringing general
information about the fundamentals of the economy. For example, a signal indicating
simply how many projects have a payoﬀ of  at date 2 without specifying the identity
of these projects or the banks owning them would rule out a number of states but would
not generate diﬀerent information partitions across the two networks. Another example
would be a signal indicating a reduction of thes a m es i z ei nt h es u c c e s sp r o b a b i l i t yo fa l l
projects.
5.3 Early liquidation proceeds
In our basic model early liquidation gives proceeds . This simpliﬁes the analysis because
it ensures that the date 1 repayment 01() promised to investors at date 0 is always equal
to . A more general formulation would be to assume that the early liquidation proceeds
are  with  ≤ 1.A v a l u e o f less than 1 w o u l dm e a nt h a t01() would have to be
greater than  in the case where there is early liquidation to allow the investors to recover
their opportunity cost. There would be higher deadweight costs and thus lower welfare
with early liquidation. This would aﬀect the welfare analysis, but qualitatively the results
24would be similar.
5.4 What is the market failure?
An important feature of the network literature and of the equilibrium concept of Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) that we have used is that banks are not able to determine the network
structure. Each bank individually chooses the links it wishes to have taking as given the
choices of the other banks. Since banks form links simultaneously, this implies that with
∗ =2either a clustered or an unclustered network can emerge. With long term ﬁnance the
multiplicity of network structures does not matter since banks and investors are indiﬀerent
between them. However, with short term ﬁnance it does matter since systemic risk and
welfare are diﬀerent as described in Proposition 5. Investors are still indiﬀerent as they
always obtain their opportunity cost, whereas banks clearly prefer the network structure
that gives them higher expected proﬁts. The market failure in our analysis is the lack of
a coordination mechanism that allows them to choose the preferred network.
One type of mechanism that may allow a degree of coordination would be to have
banks condition their linkages on the connections between all other banks in the system.
With this conditionality, it would be possible to ensure that only eﬃcient networks are im-
plemented. However, this kind of conditionality would be hard to implement particularly
as the number of banks grows large and it is not observed in practice.
Government regulation could also potentially be used to ensure only the eﬃcient net-
work is chosen. This would require the gathering of a signiﬁcant amount of information
from banks and a determination of the optimal network structure. Such regulation may
be diﬃcult to implement.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Understanding connections among ﬁnancial institutions is important for understanding
systemic risk. In this paper we have developed a model where the number and shape
of ﬁnancial connections interact with the funding structure of ﬁnancial institutions in
25determining systemic risk.
We have shown that the structure of ﬁnancial networks matters for systemic risk and
total welfare when banks use short term ﬁnance, but not when they use long term ﬁnance.
T h er e a s o ni st h a ts h o r tt e r mﬁnance entails rollover risk, which is absent with a longer
maturity of debt. Investors base the decision to roll over the debt on interim information
about banks’ future solvency. When negative information arrives, investors may infer that
they will not to be able to recover the opportunity cost associated with the renewal of
the debt. When this occurs, they do not roll over the debt thus forcing all banks into
early liquidation. The rollover risk entailed by short term ﬁnance diﬀers depending on the
structure of connections among banks.
T h ek e yt r a d eo ﬀ between the clustered and the unclustered structure in our frame-
work derives from the diﬀerent overlap and risk concentration among banks’ portfolios in
the two networks. Banks have identical portfolios in each of the two groups when they
are clustered, while they have diverse portfolios when they are unclustered. This implies
diﬀerent conditional probabilities in the two networks. The consequence is that there is
more often early liquidation and hence systemic risk in the clustered than in the unclus-
tered network, but the former can lead to higher welfare when the bankruptcy costs and
the proceeds from early liquidation are high.
In our model banks swap projects. This allows us to use a standard approach based
on network formation games. The analysis is simpliﬁed because swapping projects leads
to symmetry. Allowing banks to buy and sell shares of projects would be an interesting
extension. In addition to the symmetric equilibria that we have analyzed, there would
also be asymmetric equilibria.
We have derived our results assuming that bankruptcy costs are constant irrespective
of the number of banks defaulting. If, as in several other papers, such as Wagner (2010)
and Ibragimov, Jaﬀee and Walden (2010), we were to assume that they were increasing in
the number of defaults, the clustered network would be less attractive but our qualitative
results would be similar. The case where the bankruptcy costs are independent of the
26number of bank defaults is an interesting benchmark.
Our results provide some insights on the desirability of risk concentration depending on
the magnitude of the bankruptcy costs and the proceeds from early liquidation. The main
insight is that when bankruptcy is ineﬃcient but early liquidation is not, it is optimal to
have fewer instances with more banks defaulting as in the clustered network rather than
more frequent instances with less banks defaulting as in the unclustered network. In other
cases it is better to spread out default across states as in the unclustered network.
The crucial market failure in our analysis is that banks choose their individual degree
of diversiﬁcation but do not determine the network structure. Hence there can be multiple
n e t w o r ks t r u c t u r e sw i t hd i ﬀerent properties in terms of systemic risk for a given level of
individual diversiﬁcation. An important topic for future research concerns the implication
of this result for ﬁnancial regulation. One possibility is that governments and central banks
are directly able to regulate the network of linkages. However, this would require a great
deal of information. One measure to ensure clustered networks rather than unclustered
networks if this was optimal might be to limit ﬁnancial institutions to their home countries
rather than allowing them to pursue opportunities in other countries. Much work clearly
r e m a i n st ob ed o n eo ns u c hp o l i c yi s s u e s .
27AA p p e n d i x
Derivation of suﬃciency of condition (4). To ensure that bankruptcy only occurs
when all projects in a bank’s portfolio return  for any  =0 5, we need to show
that there exists a value of  in the interval [2
 +
1+ ] that satisﬁes the investors’
participation constraint (1). Substituting Pr(  )=( 1− )1+ and Pr( ≥ )=
1 − (1 − )1+ into (1), this requires
(1 − (1 − )1+)
 + 
1+
+( 1− )1+ ≥ 2
 (15)
for any  =0 5. To show that (4) is suﬃcient for (15) to hold, we show that the left
hand side of (15) is decreasing in  for  =0 5. To see this, we diﬀerentiate the left
hand side of (15) with respect to  and obtain
¡















(1 − (1 − )1+)
1+







It is suﬃcient that the last expression is negative for any  =0 5. To see this is
the case, initially consider the ﬁrst term
h
(1−(1−)1+)
1+ +( 1− )1+(1 − )
i
.I t sv a l u e
is 0 when it is evaluated at  =0 .D i ﬀerentiating it with respect to  gives
−(1 + )(1 − )(1 − )  0
for any  ∈ (01). This guarantees that the ﬁrst term is positive for any  =0 5.T h e
second term is  −
(+)
1+  0 since   . Together, these imply that the right
hand side of (16) is negative and hence also that the left hand side of (15) is decreasing
in  as required. It is then suﬃcient to assume that (15) holds for  =5to ensure that
it holds for any other . ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. Given that condition (4) implies that bankruptcy only
28occurs when all projects in a bank’s portfolio return , a bank’s expected proﬁt( 3 )w i t h
 =2simpliﬁes to
()=() − 2
 − (1 − )3(1 − ) − 2
To show pairwise stability, we ﬁrst consider severing a link. Suppose that bank 1 severs
t h el i n kw i t hb a n k3 so that its portfolio is now 2
31 + 1
32 and its proﬁti s
1( − 13)=() − 2
 − (1 − )2(1 − ) − 
Bank 1 does not deviate if () ≥ 1( − 13),w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed for  ≤ (1 −
)2.





64 and its proﬁti s
1( + 14)=() − 2
 − (1 − )4(1 − ) − 3
when bankruptcy occurs when all projects pay oﬀ . If bankruptcy occurs more often
than this, the expected proﬁt from the deviation will be lower. Thus, it is suﬃcient for the
deviation not to be proﬁtable that () ≥ 1(+14) which requires  ≥ (1−)3(1−).
Since all banks are symmetric, this shows that ∗ =2is a pairwise stable equilibrium for
the range of  given in the proposition.
To see that ∗ =2is the Pareto dominant equilibrium it is suﬃcient to show that bank’s
expected proﬁt is highest in this case since the investors always obtain their opportunity
cost. First note that (5) is concave in . Combining this with the condition that  lies in the
range given in the proposition, it follows that a bank’s expected proﬁt in the equilibrium
with ∗ =2is greater than in either the equilibrium with ∗ =1or ∗ =3or any other
equilibrium. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . We proceed in two steps. First, we ﬁnd the minimum
29value of  as a function of the short term risk free rate 2
 in each interval of the bank’s
portfolio return  such that investors’ participation constraint (7) is satisﬁed for a feasible
promised repayment 
12(). Second, we compare the functions representing the minimum
values of  found in the ﬁrst step to ﬁnd the equilibrium value of 
12().




3 ]. Substituting 
12()=2+
3 in (7) and using the distribution













 − 7(2 + )
24
.























































The interpretation of () and () is the same as the one for ().
Step 2.T o ﬁnd the equilibrium value of 
12() deﬁned as the minimum promised
30repayment that satisﬁes (7), we now compare the functions () () and
(). We then obtain:
() − ()=
72













6 , and negative otherwise. Similarly, it can be shown that ()−() 
0 for any 2
 ∈ [2
 5+
6 ] and   13
12,w h i l e() − ()  0 for any
2
 ∈ [2
]. Given that in equilibrium the bank oﬀers the minimum level of 
12() that
satisﬁes (7), the proposition follows. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . We proceed in two steps as in the proof of Proposition 3.




3 ]. Substituting 
12()=2+
3 in (7) and using the distribution













 − 17(2 + )
24
.




























 − 6( +2 )


























Step 2. We now compare the functions () () and () to ﬁnd
equilibrium value of 
12(). After some algebraic manipulation it is easy to see that
()  ()  () for any 2
 ∈ [ 5+
6 ]. Thus, the proposition
follows given that the bank always oﬀers investors the minimum total repayment that
satisﬁes (7). ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . The proposition follows immediately from the comparison
of total welfare in the two networks in the diﬀerent regions. We analyze each region in
turn.












(1 − ) − 2 (17)
for  =  as a bank’s expected probability of default at date 2 is the same in two
structures.




3 ] in the clustered network and for 
12() ∈ [2
 2+
3 ] in the un-
clustered network. Investors roll over the debt in both networks but the bank default
probabilities now diﬀer in the two structures. From (13) and Table 3, total welfare in the















] − 2 (18)
and by (17) in the unclustered network. It follows immediately that () ().
32Regions C1 and C2.F o r () ≥ (), (7) cannot be satisﬁed for any





in the unclustered network. Thus, the bank is liquidated and, from (14), total welfare in
























whereas () is still given by (17) in the unclustered network.




[4 +( 3+8 ) − 152
].
Equating this to zero and solving for  as a function of 2
 gives the boundary between
Regions C1 and C2:
 =
152
 − 3 − 4
8
.
I tc a nb ee a s i l ys e e nt h a t() () for   and () () for  .
Region D.F o r (),( 7 )c a n n o tb es a t i s ﬁed for any 
12() ≤  so that banks
are early liquidated in both networks. Total welfare is still as in (18) in the clustered




























(2 +3  + −52
)
which is positive for any 2
 ∈ [ 5+
6 ]. ¤
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States of the world 
Banks’ portfolio returns 
Total 
defaults  Cluster 1 Cluster  2 
θ1   θ2  θ3  θ4  θ5  θ6  X1 X 2 X3 X4 X5  X6
1  RH RH  RH  RH  RH  RH  RH  RH RH RH RH  RH 0
2  RH  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH RH (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
3  RH  RH  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH RH (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
4  RH  RH  RH  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH RH (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
5  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 RH RH  RH 0 
6  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 RH RH  RH 0 
7  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 RH RH  RH 0 
8  RH  RH  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH RH (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
9  RH  RH  RH  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH RH (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
10  RH  RH  RH  RL  RH  RL  RH  RH RH (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
11  RH  RL  RH  RL  RH  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
12  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
13  RH  RL  RH  RH  RL  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
14  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 RH RH  RH 0 
15  RH  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
16  RH  RH  RL  RH  RL  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
17  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
18  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 RH RH  RH 0 
19  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
20  RL  RH  RH  RH  RL  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
21  RL  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
22  RL  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 RH RH  RH 0 
23  RH  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL  RH  RH RH RL RL  RL 3 
24  RH  RL  RH  RL  RL  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
25  RH  RL  RH  RL  RH  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
26  RH  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
27  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
28  RH  RL  RL  RL  RH  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
29  RH  RH  RL  RL  RH  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
30  RH  RH  RL  RH  RL  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
31  RH  RL  RL  RH  RL  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
32  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
33  RL  RH  RH  RH  RL  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
34  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH  RL  (2RL +RH )/3  (2RL +RH )/3 (2RL +RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
35  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL  RH  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
36  RL  RH  RH  RL  RH  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
37  RL  RL  RH  RL  RH  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
38  RL  RL  RH  RH  RL  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
39  RL  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH  RL  RL RL RH RH  RH 3 
40  RL  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
41  RL  RH  RL  RH  RL  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
42  RL  RH  RL  RH  RH  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 0 
43  RH  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 RL RL  RL 3 
44  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 RL RL  RL 3 
45  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
46  RH  RL  RL  RL  RH  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
47  RH  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
48  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL  (RL +2RH )/3  (RL +2RH )/3 (RL +2RH )/3 RL RL  RL 3 
49  RL  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
50  RL  RL  RH  RL  RH  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
51  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
52  RL  RL  RL  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL RL (RL+ 2RH)/3 (RL+ 2RH)/3  (RL+ 2RH)/3 3 
53  RL  RL  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL RL (RL+ 2RH)/3 (RL+ 2RH)/3  (RL+ 2RH)/3 3 
54  RL  RL  RL  RH  RL  RH  RL  RL RL (RL+ 2RH)/3 (RL+ 2RH)/3  (RL+ 2RH)/3 3 
55  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL  RH  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
56  RL  RH  RL  RH  RL  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
57  RL  RH  RL  RL  RH  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 0 
58  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 RL RL  RL 3 
59  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 RL RL  RL 3 
60  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL RL (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 3 
61  RL  RL  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL RL (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 3 
62  RL  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL RL (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 3 
63  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL  (2RL+ RH)/3  (2RL+ RH)/3 (2RL+ RH)/3 RL RL  RL 3 
64  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL RL RL RL  RL 6 
 






States of the world 
 
Banks’ portfolio returns  Total 
defaults 
θ1   θ2  θ3  θ4  θ5  θ6  X1  X2 X3 X4 X5  X6
1  RH RH  RH  RH  RH  RH  RH  RH RH RH RH  RH 0
2  RH  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  RH 0 
3  RH  RH  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH RH  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
4  RH  RH  RH  RH  RH  RL  (RL +2RH)/3  RH RH RH (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
5  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 RH  RH  RH 0 
6  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  RH  RH 0 
7  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 RH  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
8  RH  RH  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
9  RH  RH  RH  RH  RL  RL  (RL +2RH)/3  RH RH  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
10  RH  RH  RH  RL  RH  RL  (RL +2RH)/3  RH (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
11  RH  RL  RH  RL  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  RH 0 
12  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
13  RH  RL  RH  RH  RL  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
14  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 RH  RH 0 
15  RH  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3  RH 0 
16  RH  RH  RL  RH  RL  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
17  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH  RL ( RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
18  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 RH RH  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
19  RL  RH  RH  RH  RH  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 RH RH (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
20  RL  RH  RH  RH  RL  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 RH (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
21  RL  RH  RH  RL  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
22  RL  RH  RL  RH  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 RH  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
23  RH  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL  (RL +2RH)/3  RH  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 RL  (2RL+RH )/3 1 
24  RH  RL  RH  RL  RL  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
25  RH  RL  RH  RL  RH  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
26  RH  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
27  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3  1 
28  RH  RL  RL  RL  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 RL  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3  RH  1 
29  RH  RH  RL  RL  RH  RL  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
30  RH  RH  RL  RH  RL  RL  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
31  RH  RL  RL  RH  RL  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
32  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
33  RL  RH  RH  RH  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3  RH  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3  RL  1 
34  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 1 
35  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
36  RL  RH  RH  RL  RH  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
37  RL  RL  RH  RL  RH  RH  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
38  RL  RL  RH  RH  RL  RH  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
39  RL  RL  RL  RH  RH  RH  (2RL+RH )/3  RL  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 RH  (RL +2RH)/3 1 
40  RL  RH  RL  RL  RH  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 0 
41  RL  RH  RL  RH  RL  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
42  RL  RH  RL  RH  RH  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
43  RH  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  RL  (2RL+RH )/3 1 
44  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL  (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3 RL RL  (2RL+RH )/3 2 
45  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 RL RL (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 2 
46  RH  RL  RL  RL  RH  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 RL (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 1 
47  RH  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
48  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3  RL  RL 2 
49  RL  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3  RL 2 
50  RL  RL  RH  RL  RH  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 1 
51  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL  RH  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
52  RL  RL  RL  RL  RH  RH  (2RL+RH )/3  RL RL  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (RL +2RH)/3 2 
53  RL  RL  RL  RH  RH  RL  RL  RL (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 2 
54  RL  RL  RL  RH  RL  RH  (2RL+RH )/3  RL (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 1 
55  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL  RH  (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 1 
56  RL  RH  RL  RH  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (RL +2RH)/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  RL  1 
57  RL  RH  RL  RL  RH  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 0 
58  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 RL RL RL  (2RL+RH )/3 3 
59  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 RL  RL 3 
60  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL  RH  (2RL+RH )/3  RL RL RL (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 3 
61  RL  RL  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL RL  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 3 
62  RL  RL  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3  RL  3 
63  RL  RH  RL  RL  RL  RL  (2RL+RH )/3  (2RL+RH )/3 (2RL+RH )/3 RL RL  RL 3 
64  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL  RL RL RL RL  RL 6 
 
Table 2: States of the world, banks’ portfolio returns and defaults in the unclustered network  =   = 2+
3  = +2
3  = 














Table 3: Conditional distribution of bank 0s portfolio returns in the clustered network
 =   = 2+
3  = +2
3  = 














Table 4: Conditional distribution of bank 0s portfolio returns in the unclustered network









Figure 1: Clustered (C) and unclustered (U) network
The figure depicts the clustered (C) and the unclustered (U) networks. In the former, banks are connected in two clusters of three banks 
each. Within each cluster, banks hold identical portfolios Xi but the two clusters are independent of each other. In the latter, banks are all 
connected in a circle Each of them e changes projects onl ith the t o neighboring banks and none of the banks holds identical connected in a circle. Each of them exchanges projects only with the two neighboring banks and none of the banks holds identical
portfolios. 
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Figure 2: Sequence of events 
The figure shows the timing of the model with short term finance. At date 0 each bank in network g=C,U raises one unit of funds in exchange 
for a promised return r01(g) at date 1. At the beginning of date 1, before investors are repaid, a signal S=G,B is realized. With probability q(g), 
it brings the good news that all banks will be solvent at date 2. With probability 1-q(g) it brings the bad news that at least one bank will default 
at date 2. Investors decide whether to retain r01(g) or roll it over for a total promised repayment of ρ12
S(g) at date 2. When the debt is rolled 
over, the bank continues till date 2. If it remains solvent, which occurs with probability Pr(Xi ≥ ρ12
S(g)/B), investors obtain ρ12
S(g) and the bank 
Xi - ρ12
S(g). If the bank defaults at date 2, , which occurs with probability Pr(Xi < ρ12
S(g)/B), investors obtain αXi  and the bank zero. When the 
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Figure 3: Investors’ rollover decision in the clustered and unclustered networks
The figure depicts investors’ rollover decision in both networks when the bad signal arrives as a function
RL (5RL+RH)/6
The figure depicts investors  rollover decision in both networks when the bad signal arrives as a function 
of the opportunity cost rf
2 and the fraction α of the bank’s portfolio return that investors receive in case of 
default. In Region A debt is rolled over for a repayment                                                 in both networks. 
In Region B rollover occurs still in both networks but in the clustered network the repayment is now                         
In Region C debt is rolled over in the unclustered network but 
not in the clustered one. In Region D rollover does not occur in either networks.
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Figure 4: Total welfare in the clustered and unclustered networks
The figure depicts total welfare in the clustered and unclustered networks as a function of the investors’ 
RL (5RL+RH)/6
opportunity cost rf
2 and the fraction α of the bank’s portfolio return that they receive in case of default. In 
Region A, total welfare is the same in both networks. In Region B+C1, total welfare is higher in the 
unclustered network. In Region C2+D, total welfare is higher in the clustered network.